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Abstract This note is concerned with a formal analysis of the problem of non-monotonic 
reasoning in intelligent systems, especially when the uncertainty is taken into account in a 
quantitative way. A firm connection between logic and probability is established by 
introducing conditioning notions by means of formal structures that do not rely on quantitative 
measures. The associated conditional logic, compatible with conditional probability 
evaluations, is non-monotonic relative to additional evidence. Computational aspects of 
conditional probability logic are mentioned. The importance of this development lies on its 
role to provide a conceptual basis for various forms of evidence combination and on its 
significance to unify multi-valued and non-monotonic logics. 
Few Keywords. Conditional events, conditional probability, conditional logic, intelligent 
systems, non-monotonic rules of inference. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the case of automated reasoning under uncertainty in which we wish to take 
into account the uncertainty in a quantitative way. The Bayesian approach emerges as a 
popular one, due not only to the fact that probability theory has a firm mathematical 
foundation, but also to the non-monotonicity of the conditioning operator in probability theory. 
Generalizations of logic to cope with uncertain information have led to the investigation of the 
connection between logic and probability (e.g. Hailperin, 1984, also Nilsson, 1986). At a more 
fundamental level, a logic of implicative propositions, compatible with conditional probability 
assignments, needs to be established in order to explain conditional reasoning. Such a logic is 
given in Adams' book (1975). However, in Adams' work, basic objects, namely implicative 
propositions or conditionals, are taken as primitive in our natural language; syntatic logical 
operations among conditionals are defined in an ad-hoc manner (simply as one of many 
possible ways of extending those in Boolean logic); and the basic component for reasoning, 
namely the logical entailment relation, is defined semantically only for plausible reasoning (i.e. 
with defaults). Note that, in 1968, Schay published a paper on a mathematical algebra of 
conditional events! In this paper, we will use our recent works (Goodman and Nguyen, 1988; 
Goodman, Nguyen and Walker, 1990) to supply a conditioning operator in logic, compatible 
with that in probability theory, and to show that it is possible to construct mathematically a 
conditional extension of the first-order logic in which a natural order relation among 
conditionals is non-monotonic relative to additional evidence. The problem of conditional 
probabilistic entailment is discussed, and some computational aspects are outlined. 
2. Non-monotonic rules of inference 
Each reasoning procedure in intelligent systems is essentially based upon a logical 
consequence (or logical entailment) relation in a given logic. In classical first-order logic, the 
entailment relation � is simply the order relation � in the Boolean ring R (of subsets of 
some set .Q, where � is subset inclusion relation, and, by Stone's representation theorem, R 
represents the collection of propositions in a natural language). To keep things simple, the 
connectives "and", "or", and "not" are denoted by ·, V and ( ·) ', respectively. Also, for 
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exposltlon purposes, It 1s convenient to view R as an algebraic ring with multiplication 
· 
, 
addition + (symmetric difference of sets), zero 0 (empty set) and unity 1 (Q). The partial 
order on R is: a, b e R, a :::; b if and only if ab = a. This :::; in first order logic is obviously 
monotonic: if a :::; b then 'Vc e R, we have ac :::; b. More specifically, for A c:: R, and 
Th(A) = {x e R :  A::? x}, we say that ::? is monotonic if A C:: B c:: R implies Th(A) c:: Th(B). 
The rule ::? is non- monotonic if it is not monotonic. By abuse of language, a reasoning 
procedure is said to be monotonic or non-monotonic according to whether ::? is monotonic or 
not. The terms "inference", "reasoning" and "logic", as in probabilistic inference, probabilistic 
reasoning, and probabilistic logic, should be understood with care! For example, while 
probability logic is monotonic, the probabilistic reasoning is claimed to capture a 
non-monotonicity property! It turns out that it all depends on the structure of the syntax of the 
logic used. To make things precise, by conditional inference (or reasoning), we mean E ::? a 
K 
(a follows logically from E in the context of K), where T = <K, E> is a theory (Pearl, 
1988), K is the knowledge base and E is the evidence. In this framework, ::? acts like a 
set-valued function with two arguments (K, E). 
The non-monotonicity of ::? is in general relative to E, i.e. to the addition of facts or 
evidence. This explains why conditional probability operator is referred to as being 
non-monotonic: For fixed a e R, the set-function P(a I · ) is not monotonic with respect to :::; 
on R. For non- monotonic reasoning, we refer the reader to McDermott and Doyle (1980), 
Reiter (1980), McCarthy (1980), Bibel (1986), Geneserth and Nilsson (1987), Pearl (1988). 
To bridge the gap between logic and probability, it is necessary to define a 
conditioning operator in logic, or in Pearl's words "a new interpretation of if-then statements, 
one that does not destroy the context sensitivity of probabilistic conditionalization" (Pearl, 
1988, p. 25). This is consistent with Pearl's words (again) "probabilists should be challenged 
by the new issues that emerge from the AI experiment" (Pearl, 1988, Preface), or with Grosof 
"non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning requires us to employ principles for drawing 
conclusions which properly extend (i.e. go beyond) the axioms of classical probability" 
(Grosof, 1988). This will be achieved in the next section. Note that this situation is analogous 
to that of quantum probability (e.g. Gudder, 1988): although quantum mechanics is essentially 
a probabilistic theory, Kolmogorov's probability model is inappropriate. 
3. The mathematical conditional extension of logic. 
Statements of the form "most b's are a's", "usually, birds fly", "if b then a", etc., are 
referred to as conditionals or implicative statements, and are symbolized as (a I b) to 
distinguish them from material implication forms b -1 a = b' V a. 
As in Adams (1975), the basic requirement is that probabilities of conditionals are 
conditional probabilities. Now, to capture the meaning of conditioning, an object like (a I b) 
should represent the class of all events x e R which are "equivalent" to a in the context of 
b, where the "context of b" means the class of "consequents of b": if b is true, then x V b 
is also true. In other words, the context of b is the filter R V b = { x V b : x e R}. Some 
algebraic manipulations lead to 
Ca l b)=a + -Rb' = {x=a + rb' :re R} , 
a coset of R. 
Let RIR denote the conditional extension of R, i.e. 
RIR = { (a I b) = a + Rb' , a, b e R}. 
Note that R is contained in RIR via the identification a +-+ (a 11). It is easy to derive 
equivalent forms of Ca l b). An intuitive one, is an interpretation in "interval analysis": Since 
x =a+ rb' = ar' V ab, we have: ab:::; x:::; b' V a, i.e. (a l b) c:: [ab, b -1 a]. - Conversely, if 
ab:::; x:::; b 1 V a, then there exists r e R such that x = ab + rb 1, i.e., x e (ab I b) = (a I b). Thus 
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(alb)= [ab, b-+ a]. 
The logical operations on RIR turn out to be 
(ajb)' =(a' jb) 
(alb)·(cld) = (acla'b V c'd V bd) 
(alb) V (cld) =(a V clab V cd V bd). 
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For inference purposes, the extended order relation to RIR is useful. Define 
(alb)::;; (cld) as (alb)·(cld) =(alb). This happens as soon as ab::;; cd and c'd::;; a'b. 
It can be shown that if (a I b) ::;; (c I d), then , for any probability measure P, we have 
P(alb)::;; P(cld). 
Now the conditioning operator ( · I · ·) is non-monotonic relative to the second 
argument. Indeed, for a, b, c e R, we have in general ab::;; abc and a'b::;; a'bc, so that 
(a I b) and (a I be) are not comparable. This fact also explains the non-monotonicity of the 
conditioning probability operator. See also Dubois and Prade (1988, 198 9). 
4. Reasoning with and computational aspects of conditional logic. 
In the reasoning framework T = <K, E>, as in Pearl (1988), where K c R/R and 
E s R, conditionals of interest are of the form (a I E), for a e R, and in this notation, E stands 
for the conjunction of all events in E. When K is fiven together with conditional 
probabilities a.= P(c.ld.), i = 1, 2, ... , n ,  say , where (c. d.) e K, the value of P(aiE) 1 1 1 1 1 
represents a degree of logical entailment. See also Goodman, Nguyen and Walker (19 90). 
We will discuss here only a formal computational procedure for P(a I E). It is simply a 
generalization of Hailperson (1984), see also Nilsson (1986). 
Now observe that 
P(alb) = P(ab) + P(alb)P(b'). 
(*) 
Thus, if !/J is a finite R-partition of .Q, of size m, say !/J= {c1, c2 , ... ,em }, and ab, b' can 
be expressed in terms of the c.'s, say 
J 
ab = l cj , b' = l cj 
jeN je M 
with N, M s { 1, 2, ... , m }, then P(al b) is related to P(cj), j e N u M, in a linear fashion. 
Hence the problem of computation of, say , P(an+llbn+l)' given P(ailbi)' i = 1, 
2, ... , n, can 
be described as follows. 
From the collection of 2(n + 1) events 
{a1, b1; a2, b2 ; ··· ; an+1' bn+1
}' 
form the canonical partition !/J of .Q consisting of all events of the form 
a1 /31 a2 /32 an+ 1 f3n+ 1 a 1 b1 a2 b2 ... an+ 1 bn+ 1 , where aj , f3j e {0, 1}, with 
a� =a., b� =b., a�= a� , b� = b� . 
J J J J J J J J 
All events ajbj, b j are decomposable in terms of the elements of this canonical partition. Let 
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rn be size of .9': rn � 22(n+1), and label these elements as c l' c2, ... , em. In view of (*), a 
coding or "design" n by m matrix IT is defined as IT= [IT . . ], where n .. = 0, 1 or lJ lJ 
P(ai l bi) according to cj � aibi, � aibi or =::;hi. Suppose that � = P(cj), j = 1, ... , m are 
solutions of the system of equations: 
m 
\' A.IT .. = P(a- l b-), i = 1, ... , n ;  L J tJ 1 1 
j=1 
m 
then P(an+1 1 bn+1) = l Ajlln+1,j' where as before, lln+1,j = 0, 1, P(an+1 1 bn+1) according 
j=1 
t < I b < b <b' 0 cj- an+1 n+1'- an+1 n+1 or - n+1" 
Of course, as in the case of unconditional probabilities, the solutions for the Aj's is not 
unique in general, and bounds for P(an+1lbn+1) can be obtained using linear programming 
technique. For practical computational purposes, stochastic optimization might be helpful. 
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